Pre-Bransford Precedent 

      Because Bransford changed “Per Se’ DUI law in California, it is imperative to look back at how this change evolved.  As far back as far as 1982, numerous due process vagueness demurrers were filed in California by attorneys who felt that it was impossible for anyone to know when they had committed a violation of California’s “Per Se” drunk driving law California Vehicle Code section 23152(b). Their analysis and reasoning was that it could not be determined when the driver consumed that last drop of alcohol crossing the threshold from what was then a legal 0.0999% to an illegal 0.1000%.  But in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, superseded by statute as recognize in People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1192, the California Supreme Court found that this subdivision is not unconstitutionally vague and does define the crime in very precise terms.  Id. at 269.  The Burg Court also rejected arguments that the statute is based upon strict criminal liability. Id. at 269-270. The per se statutes are an arbitrary exercise of the government’s power since they contain an implicit mandatory presumption that everyone is a dangerous driver at 0.08% or more. Some states have enacted statutes outlawing a per se breath alcohol concentration within a set time period after driving up to two or three hours, getting around the difficult problem of proving that the defendant had both a certain blood alcohol concentration and while driving.